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Abstract 
Power from shore is a Norwegian climate mitigation strategy that is situated in the 
middle of the Norwegian paradox of being both a climate-nation and an oil-nation. In physical 
terms, power from shore, or electrification, is the use of electrical energy from the Norwegian 
mainland to replace emission-intensive gas turbines that are producing electricity on the 
continental shelf. The ambition is to mitigate emissions from the extraction process. This 
thesis is a qualitative study of bureaucratic documents that seeks to answer the question: What 
is power from shore? Drawing on resources and insights from Science and Technology 
Studies, this open question is answered by studying the ordering of power from shore within 
Norwegian climate politics. The materials studied is a report series from the Norwegian 
public administration that includes three reports spanning from 1997 to 2008, as well as a 
political process from 2014 where the Norwegian parliament demanded electrification of the 
upcoming oil-fields on the Utsira High, a geological formation in the sea 200 km off the west 
coast of Norway. This was the first time such a demand had happened. The study shows that 
power from shore is ordered as solution to the climate problem, defined as carbon emissions 
from the production facilities, and that the emissions from the exported fuels are not taken 
into account. It also becomes a solution to a political problem; meeting the Norwegian 
domestic emission goals. Local, domestic, international and global spatial orderings are 
identified, and through the points in time, power from shore has moved from the global 
through the international, to the domestic. As such, it has followed a bigger trend in 
Norwegian climate politics. Economic expertise and calculations play a large role in ordering 
power from shore. Calculation of abatement cost has been used to make power from shore 
comparable to other measures, which in turn hide the peculiarities that are part of it. It 
becomes evident that continued extraction of oil is a premise, and is not discussed. However, 
at the last point in time, there are some evidence of small shift towards seeing the extraction 
as problematic, but this is largely seen as a separate discussion from power from shore. 
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Abbreviations 
Use this list as a reference when reading the thesis. In addition to this list, each 
abbreviation is written out in full the first time it is used in the thesis. Some of the 
abbreviations are abbreviated from the Norwegian version of the term or name. 
• AP - The Labour Party (political party) 
• CO2 - Carbon Dioxide (emission gas) 
• CCS - Carbon Capture and Storage/Sequestration 
• ENGO - environmental non-governmental organization 
• EU ETS - European Union Emission Trading System 
• FrP - The Progress Party (political party) 
• H - The Conservative party (political party) 
• HSE - Health, Safety and Environment 
• KrF - The Christian Democrats (political party) 
• MD - Norwegian Environment Agency 
• MDG - The Norwegian Green Party 
• MoF - Ministry of Finance 
• NVE - The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate  
• NPD - The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
• NOK - Norwegian Krone 
• NTB - Norwegian News Agency 
• NU - Young Friends of the Earth Norway 
• OED - The Ministry of Oil and Energy 
• PDO - Plan for Development and Operations  
• Ptil - Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
• SCEE - Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment 
• SP - The Centre Party (political party)  
• SSK - Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
• STS - Science and Technology Studies 
• SV - The Socialist Left (political party) 
• UHPH - Utsira High Power Hub 
• V - The Liberal Party (political party)  
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1 Introduction 
Norway has been an oil-extracting country since the discovery of the Ekofisk oil field in 
1969. At its peak, Norway was the world's third largest oil-exporter, and the endeavors on the 
Norwegian continental shelf have resulted in substantial incomes to the Nation. As of August 
2015, the market value of the Government Pension Fund Global (commonly referred to as the 
Oil-fund), is well over 7 000 billion NOK1 - almost 1.5 million per inhabitant. This financial 
instrument was established in the early nineties to secure long term use of the income from 
the petroleum sector, and has only been able to become so large due to a significant increase 
in the oil-extraction rate. Norway can rightfully be called an oil-nation. 
At the same time, Norway is often recognized as a forerunner in environmental and 
climate politics. In 1989, Norway set a stabilization target for carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions, as the first country in the world. Norway is currently the largest donor to REDD+, 
a global initiative that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions resulting from deforestation 
and forest degradation. Due to large hydropower reserves, the Norwegian energy mix is much 
“cleaner” than the European, where much of the energy is derived from coal. The Norwegians 
like to think of their country as a climate-nation. 
The paradox or dilemma of being both an oil- and climate-nation has been noticed and 
studied by scholars and students alike (Andresen & Butenschøn, 2001; Haug, 2010; Hovden 
& Lindseth, 2004; Nilsen, 2001; H. Ryggvik & Kristoffersen, 2015; Sydnes, 1996; Tellmann, 
2012). This master thesis will study a climate mitigation measure that is situated in the middle 
of this paradox, namely power from shore to Norwegian oil fields. According to official 
accounting systems, approximately one fourth of the Norwegian domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions today are from the petroleum industry (SSB, 2015). This number has risen 
significantly in the last three decades, and the local emissions from petroleum extraction have 
hence become an area of political and environmental interest. 
Power from shore to, or electrification2 of, the oil and gas platforms on the Norwegian 
continental shelf has been discussed in Norwegian politics for more than two decades. It has 
                                                 
1 As of August 2015, one Euro (€) is worth about 9 NOK. 
2 In this thesis, power from shore and electrification will be used as synonyms. This is not always given, as 
electrification could just as well be done from e.g. offshore wind farms. In this thesis the terms will be used 
interchangeably, and both seen as using electricity from the mainland to power oil- and gas-installations at sea. 
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been seen as a way to reduce the emissions from the extraction facilities. Gas turbines 
installed on the platforms have low efficiency and relatively high emissions. In comparison, 
electricity from the mainland can be said to have low emissions. Electricity production in 
land-based power plants has higher efficiency and much of (at least the Norwegian) power 
comes from renewable energy sources such as hydro.  
The paradoxical is that only a small amount of the emissions from fossil fuels stems 
from the extraction phase, most of it is from burning or using the fuel. The Norwegian oil 
industry themselves report that the facilities on the continental shelf emit on average 8 kg CO2 
per barrel of oil produced (KonKraft, 2009). This is very little compared to the emissions 
from consuming the fossil fuels that is 400 kg CO2 per barrel or more (Ryggvik & 
Kristoffersen, 2015). This means that power from shore is on one side aimed at an emission 
source that is a large portion of the total Norwegian domestic emissions. Compared to the 
potential emissions from the fossil fuels that are exported, however, power from shore is 
aimed at what can be said to be the minor source of emissions. 
Research has shown that the known oil, gas and coal resources in the world are more 
than what can be burned if we are to reach the internationally accepted goal of a maximum 
2ºC increase in global mean temperature, and that because of this, fossil fuels must stay in the 
ground (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). 
This master thesis goes beyond this presentation of power from shore to understand 
what it is. To do that, I argue that one have to understand what it is made to be. This means 
that we have to study how it is done - how it is talked about, defined, made and made sense 
of. Science and technology studies (STS) scholars has shown that what something is and ways 
of knowing, is tightly linked to ways of doing (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Law, 2008). This 
study will investigate what power from shore is and has been in Norwegian climate politics. 
Power from shore is the practical and technical solution of using electrical power from 
the Norwegian mainland to power oil and gas platforms and installations3. A common term 
for this practice is electrification, and it renders a platform or field electrified. As of 2015, 
five Norwegian oil-fields have power from shore, with the first being the Troll field in 1996. 
Five additional fields are planned for power from shore - four of these are part of this study. 
                                                 
3 The extent to which an oil rig is electrified can vary. One can cover only the electrical demand with electricity 
from the mainland (part-electrification), or one can include the energy demand for heat and for large pumps and 
compressors (full-electrification). This study does not make any difference between these two. 
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Since 1996, when starting up new oil fields, the oil-companies on the Norwegian continental 
shelf has to assess the energy demand and cost of utilizing power from shore as opposed to 
using gas turbines on the platforms (Innst. S. nr. 114 (1995-1996)). The main incentive for 
doing so is currently the cost of emitting CO2 (Innst. S. nr. 390 (2011–2012)), that is made up 
of a CO2 tax and the price of an emission quota in the European Union Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS). 
Electrification of the four upcoming oil and gas fields on the Utsira High - a geological 
formation on the seabed 200 km off the west coast of Norway – has been said to be an 
important climate issue (Bellona, 2014; Ropstad, 2014;Holmås, 2014). This recent political 
debate and controversial decision making process in the spring of 2014 is the starting point 
for this study. I will dive into the official documents, letters and transcripts from the process 
to understand what electrification became in the process. In addition, I will use media sources 
and supplementary interviews with key actors to gain further understanding. In the end, the 
Norwegian parliament, the Storting, ended up ordering the oil companies to use power from 
shore, despite the companies’ claims about high costs. This was the first time that this had 
happened in Norway. 
To further understand the Utsira process and power from shore, I will study 
electrification since its first appearance on the Norwegian continental shelf and political 
landscape. I will go back to three additional points in time. These points are when reports in a 
report series on electrification were published by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) 
and The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). These bureaucratic 
documents from the public administration were commissioned by the government and 
presented in 1997, 2002 and 2008. These expert documents and bureaucratic knowledge 
sources are studied together with the Utsira process to understand what electrification has 
been in the past two decades. Public administration is an often used site for knowledge 
production and the NPD and NVE are the expertise on power from shore in the political 
landscape. In politics in general science and other types of knowledge and expertise has 
become very important and are given a very important role. Shiela Jasanoff has argued that 
expertise should be seen as a form of delegated authority (2003) and following this line of 
thought, it seems both right and important to study these reports.  
These four points in time will be studied to find answers to the main research question 
in this thesis: What is power from shore? As seen from the above sections, this will be 
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answered by studying what it has become in Norwegian climate politics. I will draw on 
resources from the field of Science and Technology Studies. Inspired by John Law (1994), I 
will investigate the ordering of electrification. Here, ordering is not what the Storting did in 
the Utsira-case - to command or instruct. Rather, it is about patterns and practices of making 
something appear neat, simple and ordered. It is about patterns of simplifications and 
sensemaking. Based on the material and literature review I have chosen to study the spatial 
ordering of electrification as a climate mitigations strategy. I will also study what problem 
electrification becomes a solution to, and the expertise that is part of the ordering. Greenhouse 
gas emissions can be defined as both an environmental issue and a political problem 
(Tellmann, 2012). By answering the research question, the focus is shifted from questioning 
whether electrification is good or bad, necessary or unnecessary, to a focus on the 
complexities that is part of it and to how it is part of Norwegian climate politics. This, in turn, 
can inform decision making in the future.   
Has electrification of the continental shelf not been studied sufficiently already? I will 
argue that is has not. There are technical feasibility studies, emission studies and cost analyses 
(both societal and business economics), amongst others. I will argue that the abundance of 
studies and reports in it self makes it a subject worth studying. This thesis is written within the 
field of, and using tools and insights from, STS, and is a detailed study of a specific emission 
mitigation measure. STS insights tell us that the work and practices that is part of science and 
knowledge production matters (Latour, 1987; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). A study of the 
sensemaking or ordering of power from shore can tell us more about what electrification 
represents in Norwegian climate politics. It will hence be studied in light of the general 
climate change mitigation politics in Norway. To do this, I will also review previous studies 
on the history and discourses in Norwegian climate politics.  
There are several reasons why the Utsira High process is interesting to study. The 
political process and intervention was unusual (Ånestad, Løvås, & Kristian, 2014). Also, 
electrification has been on the political agenda and incentivized through taxing since 1996, 
but this was the first time that the Storting ordered the companies to do it. The decision was 
made in relation to, but not as part of, the concession process for the Johan Sverdrup oil field. 
Johan Sverdrup is claimed to be Norway's biggest industrial project in present time and to be 
of major importance to the Norwegian economy and workforce in decades to come (Solberg 
Government, 2015). After many years of falling production on the continental shelf, a big oil 
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field like Johan Sverdrup will potentially give an increase in production and a boost for the 
Norwegian supplier industry. 
The next chapter in this thesis outlines the reviewed literature and the analytical concept 
that I will draw upon to find answers to the research question. In chapter 3, the materials and 
methods used in the study are described in detail. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the 
reports and political process studied, and puts it in a Norwegian climate-political context to 
situate the points in time in larger political trends. Chapter 5 presents the analysis and results 
of the study. In chapter 6, I will take a step back and critically look at what has been done, 
before drawing the results together in chapter 7 to summarize and suggest further research. 
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2 Analytical concepts and reviewed 
literature 
This study will draw on resources from STS, and starts from an assumption that science 
and technology are thoroughly social activities (Sismondo, 2010). STS is a field that draws on 
many different disciplines, but has roots in critiques of the belief that science is a neutral, 
internally-driven supplier of knowledge and a progressive force (Asdal, Brenna, & Moser, 
2007). Admitting that science and technology are social activities turns the focus to the 
processes and practices it is part of. One can ask both how it is done and what it does. 
This chapter outlines the analytical concept used in this study. In the following section, 
I will present general insights from the STS literature that should be seen as a backdrop and a 
starting point for the main analytical concept that is presented in the subsequent chapter. I will 
then turn to a review of previous studies of Norwegian climate-politics. In the last sub-
chapter, I will summarize what becomes the analytical framework. 
2.1 Insights from the STS literature 
An everyday assessment of electrification would maybe identify clear separations 
between the technology, the knowledge or science about it and the politics that surrounds it. 
STS has shown that these separations are not there. Technology, science and politics are 
always connected and interwoven (Enebakk, 2002). Technoscience is a well-known concept 
within the field of STS (Asdal, Brenna, & Moser, 2007; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 
1987), and the concept suggests that there are no pre-determined boundaries for what 
constitutes technology or science, the social or the technical, science or politic. Within what is 
known as actor-network theory (ANT), an important framework or theory within STS, there 
are no a priori differences of human and nonhuman actors (e.g. Callon, 1986). In simple 
terms, it can be said that these STS insights is one way to open up the world for study. It 
requires an effort to shed oneself of the imprinted boundaries and separations that we usually 
think of as being there.  
The above insights form a base for the work done in this thesis. It starts from an 
assumption that technology, science and politics are connected and interwoven. Moreover it 
starts by questioning what is what. The physical cables that connect oil-platforms to power 
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from shore can just as well be politics, technology and science. Technology is not separate 
from science, politics is not independent of science and technology and politics is more 
complex than the social relations between people (Asdal, 2004). As Langdon Winner (1980) 
once asked: Do artifacts have politics?  
These insights and questions enables open and broad investigations of power from 
shore, and what it is becomes an interesting empirical question. To tease out what 
electrification is, I will rely on a specific thinking tool - ordering. 
2.2 Ordering - an analytical tool for imputing 
patterns 
To guide me in my analysis and to tease out answers to my research question, I have 
sought to find an analytical concept that is as open as the question itself. Ordering is 
something we do all the time. It is closely related to simplifying and is a way of making sense 
of the world. It is sensemaking. We - as humans - are not capable of taking everything into 
account. We are, to some extent, also limited in our understandings and decisions by the 
knowledge we already possess. Hence, to make sense of the world, the way in which we 
know it and the ways we do it, we are ordering. It is a continuous process. 
Ways of doing and ways of knowing is tightly coupled (Hermansen & Sundqvist, 2015; 
Latour & Woolgar, 1979). This means that by investigating how things are done, one can also 
investigate the knowing of things. In this study, I assume that there are certain patterns to be 
revealed in the practices of ordering, and that these patterns are distinguishable. Inspired by 
John Law (1994), I will conceptualize these patterns of sensemaking as orderings. The world 
is complex and of heterogeneous materiality, and John Laws term modes of ordering “is an 
attempt to create a tool to impute patterns” (p. 112). John Law has shown how heterogeneous 
practices and materialities orders the world (1994). In this study, ordering is also somewhat 
inspired by the concepts of discourse and framing. 
Within the material semiotic field, the Foucauldian definition of discourse - a strategy in 
materials - is used when one investigates what something is by asking what it is made to be 
and how it emerges (Moser, 2006). John Law has cut it down in size by introducing the term 
mode of ordering and invites us to study how ordering is done and how it enacts itself in 
different material forms (Moser, 2006). 
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Framing, like ordering, is considered to be a process. Brian Wynne is an STS scholar 
that has studied the natural scientific framing of the climate problem - making the climate safe 
and manageable - and has pointed to how this defines the public meaning of the problem and 
what it erase from view (Wynne, 2010). The framing process puts the outside world in 
brackets, but does not abolish all links to it (Callon, 1998). Framing is a process for creating 
agreement (Kall & Sundqvist, 2013), and as such, these simplifications are open for 
challenges from alternative framings (Hermansen & Sundqvist, 2015). 
To answer my research question, it is timely to look at what orderings has already been 
identified by other scholars. The following literature review is a summary of studies where 
scholars have identified different orderings in Norwegian climate politics. 
2.3 Previous studies of Norwegian climate politics 
To understand what power from shore is in Norwegian climate politics, I have reviewed 
previous studies of Norwegian climate politics. The emphasis has been on studies of 
Norwegian climate politics over time and where ordering, discourses and framings are 
identified. This chapter presents a review of some of the studies. 
Eivind Hovden and Gard Lindseth (2004) has identified two main discourses in the 
Norwegian politics on climate change, and has labeled them national action and thinking 
globally. They show how these two discourses act as basic knowledge systems when actors 
put forward standpoints on the climate change issue, and how this has changed over time. 
National action seeks reduction in domestic emissions, and says that Norway must 
demonstrate substantial national action first, and should be a responsible actor in in the global 
arena. This is in contrast to the discourse thinking globally, where international cost-
effectiveness of emission reduction is the norm. This limits the need for domestic reductions 
and is not conflict with continued Norwegian oil and gas activities. According to the authors, 
this way of thinking globally also rendered possible a line of argument that Norway could 
contribute to reduce emissions globally by exporting oil and gas to replace coal as a fossil fuel 
abroad. The national action discourse was strong in the late 1980s after the Brundtland 
report4, and was evident in the 1989 target of stabilizing Norwegian domestic emissions. This 
target was abandoned in the early 1990s, and in the negotiations over the Kyoto-protocol of 
                                                 
4 The report, named “Our Common Future” was published in 1987 by the United Nations World Commission on 
Environment and Development, led by the Norwegian prime Minister at the time, Gro Harlem Brundtland. 
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1997, Norway was a promoter of so-called flexible mechanisms where international cost-
efficiency was the goal. In other words, thinking globally has gained ground over national 
action in the timespan that Hovden and Lindseth has studied. 
Silje Maria Tellmann (2012) traces Norwegian climate policy from 1989 to 2008. In her 
study, she shows that domestic reduction target has, once again, been established in relation to 
a political climate settlement in 20085. Tellman expose the development of three ruling 
discourses in the period she studied: a tax discourse, a quota discourse and a technological 
discourse. In the tax discourse, the climate problem is interpreted as an external effect of 
otherwise rational actions, and emissions must accordingly be priced by introducing taxes as a 
quasi-market instrument. The quota-discourse originated in the same overall discourse as the 
tax-discourse, but highlight international, instead of national, cost-efficiency. In both these 
discourses, the problem is the consumer and producer behavior, the knowledge base is 
economics, but the solutions are different (tax and quotas). The third discourse, technology, 
sees the problem as old, emission-intensive technology, and the solution is accordingly 
climate friendly technology. Its knowledge base is located within engineering. As it is seen, 
the discourses are named after their solutions to the climate problem, which are interpreted in 
two different ways.  
Erlend Hermansen and Göran Sundqvist (2015) show how the IPCC uses two broad 
ways to assess policy approaches towards climate change, and that this line of thinking has 
made its way into the Norwegian political sphere. These two approaches - conceptualized as 
framings - are top-down and bottom-up. Typical policy tools for the bottom-up approach are 
what can be called push tools such as command-and-control, technological measures, 
emissions standards and legal instruments. Within the bottom-up framing, the solution to the 
problem - carbon emissions - is subsidies and other ways to pick technological losers and 
winners. The top-down framing sees economy-wide cost-efficient measures as the most ideal 
solution. Typical tools for the top-down approach are pull incentives such as economic policy 
instruments in the form of taxes and emissions trading. The top-down framing has had, and 
still has, a dominant position in Norway. The authors argue that electrification of the Utsira 
High is within the bottom-up framing. 
                                                 
5 This settlement is known as The Climate Compromise, and is the first of two such compromises in Norwegian 
Politics. We will return to this compromise later in the thesis. 
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Helge Ryggvik and Berit Kristoffersen (2015) have revisited the Norwegian oil (and 
climate) history to look at how the policies for limiting extraction rates for fossil fuels have 
changed over time. Their research is a chapter in an anthology (Princen, Manno, & Martin, 
2015) that refocus “the climate problem” from only emissions from fossil fuel consumption to 
also including the extraction of the fuels – a refocus from carbon to fossil fuels. They tell a 
story of how Norway has - over the years - abandoned all efforts to moderate the pace of oil 
extraction. Because of what the authors calls a very advantageous system for accounting 
emissions established in the Kyoto protocol, this has not been in conflict with the Norwegian 
interests of being a “green” nation. This system is based on a narrow focus on the local 
emissions from the use of fossil fuels, and is opposed to what they call total contribution to 
global emissions, where emissions from extracted and exported fuels are also accounted. The 
focus on the local emission has been strong, but Ryggvik and Kristoffersen sees an emergent 
wave of environmentalism, that in the last few years has shifted the focus more towards the 
extraction and that part of the Norwegian fossil fuel reserves must stay in the ground.  
If one tries to draw these studies together, there are many differences, but also 
similarities. The study that maybe stands out the most from the others is the last, by Ryggvik 
and Kristoffersen. The two scholars look at how the climate problem is understood, while the 
others are more concerned with the solutions. This might be due to when the different studies 
were published, and the timespan they study. The other studies have identified discourses and 
framings that can be identified with an ordering of the climate issue as strictly an emission 
problem. This is maybe not surprising given Ryggvik and Kristofferson's revisited history. 
This aspect of problem-solution definition is one of three different aspects to Norwegian 
climate orderings that stand out in the above studies. 
The second is the spatial ordering. Especially Hovden and Lindseth make this clear 
with their two discourses termed national action and global thinking. Accounting schemes for 
emissions are important for their ordering - as the main instrument within global thinking are 
the Kyoto mechanisms. 
The third aspect that stands out is the knowledge base or expertise that is part of the 
ordering. The knowledge bases are part of what separates the different orderings and the main 
two bases are economic and technical/engineering. Also, Kristin Asdal (1998) and Werner 
Christie Mathisen (2003) have shown how economic knowledge and the economists have 
gotten a hold of the Norwegian environmental politics since the 1970s. 
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These three aspects, together with the analytical thinking and analyzing tool ordering 
and the STS insights discussed earlier, forms the basis for the analysis. 
2.4 Analytical concept - three aspects of ordering 
power from shore 
This chapter summarizes the analytical framework that has been formed in relation to 
STS literature, the empirical material and the literature review of Norwegian climate politics. 
Three aspects of the orderings of power from shore will be analyzed. This is done to 
understand what power from shore becomes at the four points in time. This is based on an 
assumption that how ordering of power from shore is done, affects what it is and becomes. 
The first part of the analytical challenge is related to the ordering of power from shore 
as a solution to a problem. As the reviewed literature has shown, it is not given what the 
problem is made to be and there is a plethora of solutions. To analyze how power from shore 
has been ordered to fit, or solve, certain problems will be an important part of the analysis. 
The second aspect is the ordering of power from shore, spatially. The climate problem, 
however it is defined, is a global problem. There is one shared atmosphere, albeit the burden 
or the consequences of our common actions is felt differently at different places on earth. 
From the studies presented above, however, we learn that the policies and discourses in 
Norwegian climate politics have e.g. changed between a national focus and a global focus. 
How is this done in relation to, and what does it do to, power from shore? 
The third aspect is related to the questions surrounding expertise. What knowledge is 
made relevant, and is this knowledge important? We know that expertise has taken or been 
given the authority to define issues or problems (Wynne, 2010), and that our current 
democracy relies heavily on knowledge (and its producers) to govern and to make decision. 
This however is not given. Hence, part of this study is to look at what part expertise takes in 
ordering power from shore as a climate mitigation strategy. This is based on an assumption 
that who, or what expertise, is ordering, changes what electrification is and becomes. 
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3 Materials and methods 
This thesis studies electrification at four different points in time. The most recent and 
the starting point for this project is the Utsira High power solution decision making process 
from 2014. The three other points are 1997, 2002 and 2008, and are all studied through a 
report series from the NPD and NVE. These four points, or sites, are studied in an open and 
symmetric way, and using qualitative methods and data. The ways in which they are studied 
has been chosen based on both practical considerations and methodological interest, but most 
of all because they are thought to be valuable ways to study the subject at hand. This chapter 
outlines the materials and methods used in this study. 
Qualitative research processes has a cyclical nature and will likely alternate between the 
process of induction and deductive reasoning (Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2010). In this 
project, this has proven to be true, and it has also been sought out explicitly. The main 
methodological philosophy that I have employed is that the empirical material should inform 
the analytical perspectives. It should be open and emergent. As I have gained deeper insights 
into the case, the project, methods and analytical resources has changed. I have followed the 
materials to dead ends and I have experienced the so-called snowball-effect. 
To understand what electrification becomes in Norwegian climate politics, one must 
turn to the main site, to politics. There are many ways to do this, and many possible stones to 
turn. The focus in this study has been close reading of bureaucratic texts. 
Bureaucratic texts and documents are part of the realities that we are interested in 
approaching and studying (Asdal, 2015), and hence are valuable sites for study. They are not 
simply instruments of bureaucratic organizations, but rather are constitutive of bureaucratic 
rules, ideologies, knowledge, practices, subjectivities, objects, outcomes, even the 
organizations themselves (Hull, 2012). This means that we can turn to these documents to 
learn more than just the contents of it. By close reading - by looking both through and at the 
paperwork (Kafka, 2009) - we can gain insights into the subject we study. 
In efforts to contextualize this paperwork, I have included additional material in my 
study. Even though I believe, and this study shows, that valuable insights can be gained from 
these documents, it is important to know some more of what these documents are part of. The 
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additional material is hence not the focus of this study, but rather the means to look into the 
world that surrounds the main texts. 
In the following two subchapters, there is an overview of the both the main and the 
additional material. The last subchapter will address potential problems and ethical 
considerations related to the material. 
3.1 Main materials - Official documents and reports 
Official documents and debates related to the Utsira decision making process in the 
Storting were used to study power from shore in 2014. This includes a private suggestion 
from the two representatives from the Socialist Left party (SV) Audun Lysbakken and Heikki 
Holmås (Doc. 8:58 S (2013-2014)), the following correspondence between the Standing 
Committee on Energy and the Environment (SCEE) and the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy (OED), the proposition from the SCEE to the Storting (Innst. S. nr. 237 (2013-2014)) 
and the following debate. In addition to this, 18 questions and answers (both written and oral) 
from representatives in the Storting to Ministers in the government were included. These 
questions where identified using the search function at the Storting’s website, while limiting 
the search in time from October 2013 to June 2014. 
What electrification has been in Norwegian climate politics over time will be studied 
through the three official reports spanning over 15 years in time. NPD and NVE are 
understood to be the main experts on power from shore within the Norwegian public 
administration. NPD and NVE sorts under the OED. The reports are a series of reports 
published in 1997, 2002 and 2008, where the latter ones are updates on the previous. These 
reports attend to electrification of the installations on the continental shelf in general, both 
existing petroleum fields and fields in planning. 
3.2 Additional materials - media articles and 
supplementary interviews 
As discussed, the above main sources of data have been supplemented by other 
materials and data. A major source of such data has been media and newspaper articles. These 
have been used to get an overview of the process regarding Utsira, and to understand how the 
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reports were received. To find relevant articles I have used Atekst Retriever6. The most 
comprehensive retrieval was a query for articles that contained the words "johan sverdrup", 
"utsira*" or "elektrifisering"7 from October 2013 to June 2014. To limit the results, I selected 
only publications from Teknisk Ukeblad, the Norwegian News Agency (NTB) and 
Aftenposten. These are national news publications, and especially Teknisk Ukeblad followed 
the Utsira process closely. The query resulted in 823 results, and after an initial screening, to 
sort out unrelated articles, 313 articles was left. These were sorted chronologically and 
exported. For each of the three reports, I have used Atekst Retriever to find articles spanning 
from one month before release to one month after, querying for “elektrifisering”. 
Other sources are reports and news articles, blog posts, radio shows, press conferences, 
visiting open hearings and more. These materials have improved my knowledge of the topic 
and have mainly been identified through the other material and various web searches. 
In addition to the written materials, I have also done four supplementary interviews with 
actors in the Utsira process. The form of these talks has been un- or semi-structured and has 
been both phone calls and face to face meetings. I have talked to: 
● Ola Elvestuen - The Liberal Party (V) and member of the SCEE 
● Heikki Holmås - The Social Left Party (SV), member of the SCEE and driving force 
in the Utsira process 
● Kari Elisabeth Kaski - Environmental Non-Governmental Organization (ENGO) 
ZERO, now works for the secretariat in SV 
● Audun Randen Johnson - Secretariat in ENGO Friends of the Earth Norway  
The interviews has been recorded (except the one with Holmås), and notes has been 
taken from the recordings. The informants have been given the possibility to comment on the 
thesis. No comments were received. 
3.3 Potential problems and ethical considerations 
The main materials that have been used in this study are similar because they are all 
bureaucratic documents, but they are also very different. It ranges from reports to debate 
                                                 
6 Atekst Retriever has a comprehensive archive of Norwegian newspaper articles, press releases and other media 
sources 
7 Norwegian word for electrification 
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transcripts. Yet, I have studied them using the same method and analytical concept. At first 
glance, to study sites that are so different using the same tools, can be seen as problematic. 
Such concerns are of course important, and I have given them great thought when 
designing my study. First of all, the choice of sites has been specifically so that they are 
different. My interest has been exactly this - to study power from shore in different sites - and 
it has been important for me that the materials differed. In fact, I would have loved to include 
even more sites and different materials in my study, but due to the time-limitation of the 
master thesis, it was not possible. The concept of ordering is chosen partly because the 
materials and sites are so different. I will argue that an open concept such as ordering is a 
good way to study the materials. 
The informants have been selected based on their relation to the Utsira case. Due to 
summer holidays and the upcoming Norwegian election, politicians have been hard to get in 
touch with. Combined with a limited time-frame for this study, the result was that no more 
informants were included. The selection is therefore somewhat biased towards the opposition 
parties, as no in-government party members has been interviewed. They are however part of 
the main materials and media articles. I have been aware of this possible bias in the analysis, 
and to compensate for it I have sought to focus on the official statements from the other 
parties. The focus in this study is also not on the interviews, but on the documents, and the 
way their contents make sense of the world. This, and my open and symmetrical approach, 
makes this possible bias less problematic. A larger and broader selection of informants could 
possibly give more detailed knowledge of the case, and should be considered if further studies 
are to be undertaken. 
An ethical concern when doing a qualitative study like this one is the identification of 
the people studied and interviewed. In this thesis, all interview subjects are identified by their 
name and position. In general, when studying a person's political standings, this might be 
problematic. After all, what you vote is a private matter. This might suggest that 
anonymization could be needed. However, the persons interviewed here are “public” persons 
and politicians, and are part of this study because of their positions. 
I have considered this aspect and informed my informants of the possibility of 
anonymization. I have also reported the study to the Norwegian Data Protection Official for 
Research, to make sure that I comply with guidelines for storing, keeping and using such data. 
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In this report, I present quotes from the materials. Many of these are my translations 
from Norwegian to English. I have sought to make these translations as close and true to the 
original as possible, but some nuances might have disappeared. Quoting from the texts and 
other sources is important for this story about ordering power from shore. Any mistranslations 
or change of meaning due to translation has however not affected the analysis. I am a native 
speaker of Norwegian, and the analysis is based on the Norwegian versions of the quotes. 
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4 Power from shore at four points in 
time 
Before delving into the analysis, this section will present a summary of both the reports 
and the Utsira process. We will follow the points in time in chronological order, starting with 
the 1997 report, and ending with the 2014 Utsira process. Before, after and in-between the 
time-points, selected events and aspects of Norwegian climate politics will be presented. The 
summary of the Utsira process is necessarily different from the description of the reports. The 
descriptions of the reports include why and when these reports were commissioned (as 
presented in the reports themselves), a brief summary of what the reports contain, and their 
main conclusions. The overview will also show how the reports were received, by pointing to 
news articles from the time of their release. The summary of the Utsira process is presented as 
a timeline and will be presented after the reports. The ambition with this chapter is to present 
an overview, before analyzing the ordering of power from shore at these points in time. 
Hence, this will not be an extensive presentation. 
Now it is time to go back to the late 1980s and follow power from shore, through time 
and through Norwegian climate politics. 
4.1 Norwegian climate politics in the 1990s 
When Norway became the first nation-state in the world to establish emission reduction 
goals in 1989, it was in the wake of the Brundtland-report. The Norwegian goal was to 
stabilize national emissions at 1989 levels by the year 2000, but this target was abandoned by 
1995 (Hovden & Lindseth, 2004). In 1991, a tax was put on CO2 emissions from the oil 
sector, as an effort to reduce flaring8. In 1996, the Sleipner platform was the first offshore 
installation to utilize carbon capture and storage (CCS) to capture CO2 and store it under the 
seabed. This was a technological feat that probably would not have happened without the tax 
on CO2 emissions. Throughout the nineties, Norwegian emissions continued to rise. 
Emissions from the petroleum industry were a large part in this. During the 1990s, extraction 
and export of oil more than tripled on the Norwegian continental shelf (Ryggvik & 
                                                 
8 So-called flaring is the practice of burning gas. It can either be part of a security system where gas is flared 
when equipment is over-pressured, or it can be the burning of gas that are a byproduct when drilling for oil - 
where the gas is seen as a waste product. 
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Kristoffersen, 2015). With the upcoming Kyoto-conference in 1997, where national emissions 
targets would probably be set, there must have been some unease with these rising emissions. 
In the planning process for the Troll platform, a solution appeared. The Troll platform was 
planned for power from shore - and the local emissions from the platforms dropped 
significantly. The choice of using power from shore was a business decision made by the 
companies that had a license on the field. In a recommendation to the Storting we can read 
“Processing of the Troll-gas on Kolsnes is done with the use of hydropower, and are 
therefore without emissions of CO2. Also the platforms of the Troll-field are electrified. [...] 
The Majority [of the SCEE] ask the government to prepare an overview of the amount of 
energy and the cost of electrifying oil and gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf” 
(Innst. S. nr. 114 (1995-1996)). This leads us to the first power from shore report. 
4.2 1997 - Report number one 
The title of the first report is “Electricity from shore to the oil- and gas business. 
Possibilities, costs and energy amount” (NPD & NVE, 1997), and is a part of the follow-up 
from the recommendation to the Storting from the previous section. 
The main body of the text is devoted to the technical aspects of electrification. Energy 
consumption, power supply possibilities, connection point on shore, cables, transformers and 
more makes out the bulk of the report. Six geographical areas are selected as suitable for 
power from shore, and suggest a separate distribution platform for each area. Some platforms 
and areas are excluded due to “short remaining production period” (p.17) and “limited 
knowledge of future energy demand” (p.17). A major aspect of the report is where the power 
would come from. 
The report states that it is assumed that there will not be sufficient electricity production 
on the mainland to electrify the Norwegian continental shelf and proposes three solutions to 
cover the rising demand. These three solutions are increased net import, new gas power 
plants or new hydropower. To cover the full demand using only import and new hydropower 
is presented as less likely than gas power, and more expensive. It would demand 
reinforcement and new investments on the grid and the time-consuming concession process 
for hydro is presented as a major problem on its own. The report concludes that the import 
scenario is an “undesirable alternative when the goal is to reduce the total CO2-emissions” 
(p. 28), because the total CO2-cuts will be “zero, or most likely negative” (p.28). This is due 
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to the assumption that imported electricity comes from coal power plants in Europe. Gas 
power, however, would have relatively lower investment costs, and would be located near 
connection points on shore (which would be close to where the gas-pipes are connected to 
shore). At the time when the report was written, Naturkraft had been granted a license for two 
planned gas power plants, but this had been appealed to the OED (Tjernshaugen, 2007). The 
report states that gas power plants could become “highly controversial” (p. 30) and such 
projects could “meet considerable resistance” (p.5).  
The general conclusion is that new hydropower becomes the most cost effective way to 
reduce emissions due to low operating expenses and high reductions of CO2 emissions, but is 
seen as less likely than building new gas power plants. The way this is evaluated is through 
the calculation of abatement cost, which “forms a basis for comparing electrification to other 
possible measures in the petroleum sector” (p. 3). The abatement cost is calculated in 
Norwegian kroner (NOK) per ton CO2 emissions possibly mitigated.  
The report was presented by the Minister of Oil and Energy Ranveig Frøiland, from the 
Labour Party (AP), on May 16th 1997. Based on the report, Frøiland concluded that it was too 
expensive and that the oil companies themselves would decide whether or not to invest in 
power from shore (Olkvam, 1997). In a leading article titled “Untalented minister” in the 
daily newspaper Dagens Næringsliv (1997), it was claimed that she misused the numbers in 
the report and that the cost would be much less than what she presented. “When we got the 
report, it became kind of out of the question to go forward with it”, Frøiland has later said 
(Martiniussen & Løvås, 2014). 
4.3 Kyoto, gas power and CCS 
In December 1997, the so-called Kyoto protocol was adopted. It is an international 
agreement where nations set binding emission reduction targets. It sets a limit to the increase 
in the Norwegian emissions. In the international negotiations however, Norway had been a 
promoter of flexible solutions (Hovden & Lindseth, 2004), where nations could pay for 
emission cuts in other countries to meet the targets that they had agreed to. The protocol 
allowed for emission abatement measures abroad to be counted towards a nation's account 
through tradable quotas, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism 
(Tellmann, 2012). This is a major development that happened between the first and the 
second report.  
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Also, the authors of the first reports had seen a possibility for gas power plants to be a 
controversial issue. One of the biggest climate and environment-related issues in Norway in 
the late nineties and early years of the new century was the gas-power issue. Andreas 
Tjernshaugen (2007) tells a story about the issue, or what he calls twenty years climate battle. 
During the 1990s, there was an increased interest from politicians and industry to industrialize 
on and use the Norwegian gas in Norway. Gas power plants was one of such strategies, but in 
the month after the first NVE and NPD report was released, in February 1997, a secret 
alliance called “The common action against gas power plants”9 was formed. The organization 
was established by seasoned, former members of Young Friends of the Earth Norway (NU) 
and local gas power protest groups. While there was a huge controversy on the on-shore gas 
power plants, many new oil fields started operations with small gas-power stations (NPD, 
2015). The “problem” on the continental shelf was increasing. 
It was not obvious that land-based gas power was bad for the climate. The argument 
that gas replaced coal and nuclear power abroad had gained footing. “Degrees of deviltry”, 
said the Minister of the Environment at the time, Torbjørn Berntsen (Tjernshaugen, 2007). 
For the opponents, what became their strategies was both stating just how much a power plant 
would emit (sometimes compared to how many cars it would equal) and a focus on the 
Norwegian climate-political commitments. A focus on the local and domestic emissions was 
their strategy. The gas power issue was important in the years to come, and in 2000, Prime 
Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik and his government resigned after they got the Storting 
against them in a gas power dispute.  
The promise of “clean” gas power plants based on CCS had also gained traction in 
Norway, both in the political parties and within ENGO’s. By separating out the carbon, either 
from the gas prior to burning or from the exhaust, and storing it underneath the ground or 
seabed, one would eliminate the emissions from the plants. This was not science fiction at the 
time, as the technology had been in use in the USA since the 1980s and on the Norwegian 
continental shelf since 1996, where the Sleipner platform was the first offshore installation to 
utilize CSS. The energy efficiency and how safe the storage was, was of course debated, but 
the proponents of this technological fix argued that these were surmountable obstacles. When 
the second report from NPD and NVE was commissioned and released, gas power was still 
part of the plan, but also with a little twist – CCS. 
                                                 
9 Fellesaksjonen mot gasskraftverk 
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4.4 2002 - Report number two 
The title of the second report is “Power supply from shore to the continental shelf. 
Possibilities, costs and environmental impact” (NPD & NVE, 2002). Since 1997, there had 
been “technological development” (p.8) and “change in the general conditions and supply 
situation” (p. 8), so OED asked NPD and NVE to make a new report on power from shore.  
The report is similar to the 1997 one in many ways. Three selected areas are presented, 
and the technical aspects and energy demand profiles are laid out. It is also different in many 
ways. It includes a fourth way of meeting the increased electricity demand from 
electrification: Gas power plants with CO2 sequestration. This fourth solution is also 
concluded to be the most promising, even though there are “no assessment of the technical 
aspects [...] or the probability of it being realized [on time]” (p. 62). It is presented as the 
most cost effective, compared to the other two. But compared to other abatement projects, 
they are considered to be “very costly contributions towards reaching Norway's commitments 
to the Kyoto- and Gothenburg protocols” (p.7). Again, this is based on abatement cost 
calculations. 
The results from the reports where presented on November 25th 2002. In a press release 
from NVE and NPD they conclude explicitly that it “will be too expensive to supply the 
continental shelf with power from shore, and the environmental gain from such an 
electrification is highly uncertain” (NVE, 2002) under the headline “NPD and NVE: Do not 
recommend electrification”. The conclusion is accepted, but Brit Skjelbred from the Ministry 
of Oil and Energy admits that while shortage of electricity and high costs are a problem, the 
government hopes that their support for gas power with CO2 sequestration might help. “We 
want to reduce the emissions from the continental shelf” (Næss & Rugland, 2002), she stated. 
The Minister of Oil and Energy at the time, Einar Steensnæs from the Christian Democrats 
(KrF) has later stated that “We had ambitious politics, and the politicians had good 
intentions. But when you receive an expert report that is so clear [...] it becomes hard not to 
take it into account” (Martiniussen & Løvås, 2014). 
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4.5 Emission trading and the electricity market 
In 2005, between the second and the third report, the EU ETS was launched. It is the 
first and biggest CO2 emission trading scheme in the world, and it is a cornerstone in the 
European Union’s policy to combat climate change (European Commission, 2015). The 
principle behind the scheme is known as “cap and trade”. There is a cap, or upper limit, to the 
total amount of emissions, and this cap is reduced over time to bring down the total emissions. 
Companies receive or buy allowances, and these quotas can be traded among companies in a 
carbon market. The European Commission boast that “The flexibility that trading brings 
ensures that emissions are cut where it costs least to do so” (2015). The Norwegian oil and 
gas sector is part of the trading scheme. This means that oil companies operating in Norway 
have to obtain and pay for emission quotas for their emissions. 
Since the Norwegian government deregulated the market for trading electrical energy in 
1991, a Nordic, and later Northern European, power market emerged. In the year 2000, all 
four10 Nordic countries were integrated into the market, and after the turn of the century, it 
expanded further south, both physically through cable connections and as a market. The name 
of the market, NordPool, is fitting, as the marketplace can be thought of as a pool of 
electricity. Suppliers and producers “pour” their electricity into the market pool, where 
everything is mixed. The consumers draw their power use from this mix. The origin of the 
electricity consumed is then not known, unless one buys a separate guarantee of origin. These 
market mechanisms are abstracted from the physical web of cables and wires, where the 
electricity flow can be known, because electricity flows from the producer to the “electrically 
closest” consumer. Sales of guarantees of origin to consumers outside Norway is also one of 
the reasons why over half of Norwegian electricity consumption is calculated to be based on 
fossil fuels, while only two percent of the production is based on fossil fuels (NVE, 2015). 
Both of these markets make their entrance in the third report. 
4.6 2008 - Report number three 
The third report is titled “Power from shore to the Norwegian continental shelf“ (NPD, 
NVE, Ptil & SFT, 2008). After the proposition to the Storting known as the Climate 
                                                 
10 Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
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Proposition11, it was decided that the electrification report from 2002 should be updated. In 
this study, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil), that was previously a part of NPD, 
and Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) was included as part of the project and as 
authors of the report. It states clearly that “electrification of the continental shelf is driven by 
a desire to reduce emissions in Norway” (p.53). 
Four different areas are presented for possible electrification. Like the previous reports, 
details about the technical and economic aspects are considered for each area. 
The report concludes that the increased power demand for electrification has to come 
from “new dedicated production” (p.29) or “the market” (p. 29), i.e. “the existing power 
system” (p. 34). With new dedicated production, gas power plants with CO2 sequestration is 
considered to be the most realistic and viable option. This is called scenario 1, and it is stated 
that dedicated production as part the electrification measure makes sense and makes possible 
reduction CO2 emission easy to calculate. Wind, hydro and bio are discussed, but are not 
considered to be viable options. 
Electrification using power from the market gives birth to two separate scenarios. 
Scenario 2 calculates the “physical effects” (p. 34), which means calculating “net CO2 
reductions, deducted mean emissions from production in the power market.” (p. 36). This 
mean emission is considered to be emission intensity of a modern gas power plant. This 
scenario is said to be “hard to predict” (p. 35). In scenario 3, “the effect of increased power 
production abroad is reflected in increased power price rather than through increased 
emissions” (p. v). This means that the total emissions cut is equal to the emissions cut from 
the installations in the sea. 
On the 4th of January 2008, the report was given to Minister of Oil and Energy Åslaug 
Haga. This time, it did not recommend anything to the Government. “The report is an 
analysis of the costs and does not give any recommendations to the government. It is the 
politicians that should decide what measures that should be implemented to reduce the 
Norwegian emissions of greenhouse gases”, director of SFT said in a press release (SFT, 
2008). While some argued that this was the end of the electrification debate, Haga stated that 
“The emissions from the continental shelf will come down. I still think that electrification will 
                                                 
11 In Norwegian Report St. 34 (2006-2007), is known as “Klimameldingen” 
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be part of the answer, even though I hoped for other contents in the report. [...] We have to do 
another round of thinking and assess other additional measures” (Rønning, 2008). 
4.7 The climate compromise and the election in 
2013 
In the election in the fall of 2013, a new minority government between The 
Conservative Party (H) and the Progress Party (FrP) and the support parties KrF and V, was 
formed. In their collaboration agreement, the four parties agreed to “strengthen the Climate 
Compromise” (V, KrF, FrP, & H, 2013). Previously, FrP was the only (major) party outside 
the compromise, and the new agreement effectively included them in it. 
The Climate Compromise is a term for a political settlement that was first made in 2008 
in the wake of the climate proposition that was the start for the third report. It was an 
agreement between the government parties at the time, SV, AP and the Centre Party (SP), and 
the opposing parties H, KrF and V. The compromise was updated in 2012, and states that ⅔ 
of the emission cuts will be domestic (Innst. S. nr. 390 (2011–2012)). The compromise also 
deals with power from shore in general and the Utsira High in particular. It states that the 
licenses “always should assess power from shore as energy supply for new field and major 
modifications on existing fields” (p. 15) and that there is a “goal for the southern part of the 
Utsira High to be supplied with power from shore” (p. 3). This means that all parties on the 
Storting had agreed on a goal to electrify the Utsira High12. 
In the same election the Norwegian Green Party (MDG), a party that has its main focus 
on the climate and the environment, made it into the Storting for the first time. The party also 
has a focus on reducing oil production and in their political program, they explicitly put a 
focus on the emissions from the fossil fuels exported, not only the production (MDG, 2013). 
In addition to this, AP, Norway’s biggest party, was in the process of changing their leader to 
Jonas Gahr Støre. Silje Lundberg (2015) from ENGO Bellona has seen a change where the 
party has become more climate oriented after this, at least in their rhetoric’s. 
According to one of my informants, Ola Elvestuen, the special political situation with 
the new government was one of the things that made it possible to instruct the oil companies 
to electrify the whole Utsira High. 
                                                 
12 MDG is not a part of the compromise. 
25 
 
4.8 2014 - The Utsira electrification process 
Johan Sverdrup, Gina Krogh, Ivar Aasen and Edvard Grieg are all famous Norwegians 
of the past. In contemporary Norway and in the future their names will also be associated with 
four oil and gas fields in the North Sea. The oil and gas fields are all located on the Utsira 
High, a geological formation on the seabed 200 km west of Rogaland, a county on the West 
coast of Norway. In the spring of 2014 the Norwegian Storting decided to order the 
companies to electrify the Utsira High. This decision was made in connection to, but not as 
part of, the concession process leading to a plan for development and operation (PDO) and 
subsequent oil-extraction at the Johan Sverdrup field. This is what I have chosen to name the 
Utsira process. 
Before Johan Sverdrup13 was discovered, the three oil fields Gina Krogh14, Edvard 
Grieg15 and Ivar Aasen16 were planning for start-up on the Utsira High. These fields where 
discovered ranging from 1974 to 2008, and are a lot smaller that Johan Sverdrup. Edvard 
Grieg is planned to start operations in 2015 and to supply power and final processing for the 
Ivar Aasen platform. Start at Ivar Aasen is planned in 2016 and Gina Krogh in 2017. 
The three projects did a joint study of power from shore to cover all three fields - a so-
called area solution and concluded that the abatement cost would be too high to go further 
with the project (Det Norske, Statoil, & Lundin, 2011). The Johan Sverdrup oil field was 
discovered in 2010, and once the size of it was known, it was included into a joint study 
called the Utsira High Power Hub (UHPH) project, together with the three other fields. The 
power hub was foreseen as a separate platform that would receive power from shore and 
distribute it to all the fields. 
Because Johan Sverdrup is a big (in Norwegian scale) oil field and is located relatively 
short distances from shore it is a very profitable oil-field for both the oil companies and the 
Norwegian state (78 percent of the profits are taxed). The elephant17 Johan Sverdrup thus 
represents the lion’s share of both the petroleum income and the potential local emissions at 
the Utsira High. 
                                                 
13 The Johan Sverdrup oil field is previously known as Avaldsnes or Aldous 
14 The Gina Krogh oil field is previously known as Dagny 
15 The Edvard Grieg oil field is previously known as Luno 
16 The Ivar Aasen oil filed is previously known as Draupne 
17 Elephant is a common term for a large oil field. 
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While the UHPH project was still in process, the PDO’s for the three smaller field 
where being approved by the Norwegian Storting, and all of them was approved with 
conditions concerning power from shore. In the propositions for all three fields, it is stated 
that if the OED finds that an area-solution should be realized, the fields would have to 
connect to it (Lien & OED, 2014). It meant that the platforms would have to be ready to for 
an electrification area solution and it can be seen as clear indicators of a political wish and 
intention to electrify the area. 
In practice this meant that changes were made to the PDO and the platforms. An 
example of this is that for the Gina Krog platform, the Storting accepted a solution where two 
lower-emission turbines were changed to one higher-emission turbine to make room for a 
transformer that was needed for the electrification. Not only was this supposedly a more 
emission-intensive solution, it also reduced the reliability of the power supply (using only one 
turbine) (Ramsdal & Taraldsen, 2014). 
The original plan for presenting the so-called concept choice - an early stage technical 
solution - for Johan Sverdrup was by the end of 2013, but got moved to early 2014. On 
February 13th, the licenses18 and the operator19 Statoil released their concept choice for the 
first phase of the field20. Statoil confirmed that it was the electrification aspect that delayed 
the decision (Taraldsen, 2014). The concept planned for this phase was a field-center 
consisting of four platforms; a processing platform, a riser platform, a drilling platform and a 
platform with living areas for workers. In addition, it was planned with three installations on 
the seabed for injection of water. 
More importantly for this study, the concept choice stated that Johan Sverdrup where to 
have power from shore directly to one of the platforms planned for phase one, and thus 
effectively ending the UHPH project. No choices where made for the next phases of Johan 
Sverdrup and regarding the other three platforms. Debates were going in the media and at the 
Storting - both about the cost and the climate effect. Statoil was forced to release parts of their 
abatement cost calculations (Statoil, 2014) and other reports claimed that the cost was much 
lower than what Statoil presented (Add Energy, 2014). In March, the Norwegian Environment 
                                                 
18 An oil field on the Norwegian continental shelf usually has several licenses (owner interests).  
19 Among the licenses of the field, an operator is chosen. The operator usually runs the planning process and the 
practical operations of the platforms. 
20 Johan Sverdrup is planned for a phased planning and building process, meaning that more platforms and 
installations will be added later on. 
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Agency (MD) released a report (2014) on the possibilities to reach Norwegian climate goals. 
Commenting on the report, the director of the MD stated that “If we are to cut 8 million tons 
[...] then there is no escaping extensive electrification offshore” (NTB, 2014a). On top of this 
two politicians decided to intervene. 
On the 24th of April, two representatives from SV presented a private proposal (Doc. 
8:58 S (2013-2014)) to the parliament stating that the government should make sure that all 
four platforms on the Utsira High would have power from shore from day one. One of the 
proposers was Heikki Holmås. In an interview for this thesis he said that he had seen a 
majority for power from shore in the Storting already before Christmas, and that he had seen 
no signs in the government's work that signaled that they would demand electrification from 
the companies. He stated that it seemed clear that the government would let it be up to the oil 
companies. He especially referred to a statement from the OED where it was stated that the 
decision would have to be made on business terms (OED, 2014).  
The main argument for electrification was that it would have a sizable climate effect, 
and that the Storting’s climate goals (stated in the Climate Compromise) would not be met 
without it. The private proposal was handed over to the SCEE for assessment. In May, a 
combined opposition21 agreed to support a variation of this proposal. Politicians in the parties 
in government referred to the agreement as a coup (Skårdalsmo & Rønning, 2014). The 
agreement did not demand electrification from day one - but in the startup-phase (NTB, 
2014b). On June 4th, the SCEE announced that the opposition and the government had 
reached consensus and on June 12th, a unanimous parliament voted for the proposal. Now, in 
the consensus agreement, area electrification was to be done as soon as possible and not later 
than 2022 (SCEE, 2014). Who had “turned around” in the process later became contested and 
debated (Stortinget, 2015).  
This intervention from the politicians was unusual mainly for two reasons. First, it was 
the first time that the Storting actually had ordered companies to use power from shore in 
such a way. Usually the technical power solution is decided on by the licenses, but is 
incentivized through the CO2-tax. Secondly, the decision was not part of the normal process. 
My informant Holmås stated that the private proposal was an effort to make a decision before 
it was too late. He saw no way to demand electrification within the normal process, because 
                                                 
21 The opposition consisted of AP, SV, V, KrF, SP and MDG. The government consisted of H and FrP. 
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the Storting usually only process the PDO, and then investments has already been made. 
Before that, it is the government and the ministries that govern over the process and are in 
dialog with the companies. 
The debate on when it is too late to demand electrification was prominent in the 
process. While the government parties argued that waiting for the PDO would not be too late 
and that one would have more knowledge at that time, the opposition arguments was close to 
that of Holmås.  
4.9 Trends in contemporary climate debates and 
politics 
As Ryggvik and Kristoffersen (2015) argue that there is an emergent environmentalist 
wave and alliance aimed at stopping the uncontrolled rate of extraction of fossil fuels in 
Norway. An additional example of this is V voting against oil drilling and recovery in the 
arctic in their 2015 general assembly (Giverholt, 2015). This was based on “traditional” 
environmental concerns, but also a concern for leaving the fossil fuel resources where they 
are. Also, MDG has promoted stopping further search and recovery of oil for a while (MDG, 
2013), and the Storting has decided that the Government Pension Fund of Norway will divest 
in coal (Krekling, Norum, & Kolberg, 2015). SV eventually voted against building the Johan 
Sverdrup platforms stating “Climate change demands transition, and that oil is left unused” 
(SV, 2015). 
This trend does not mean that the emissions are not seen as a problem, because in the 
end, it is the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere that causes global warming. It is rather a 
trend that also recognizes the problem as the production and that producers (such as Norway) 
should be held responsible. This means that there is a shift from strictly focusing on the 
emissions, to also focusing on the extraction. The rationale is that if we extract fossil fuels, it 
will be burned, and that there are more resources than what we can safely use. Therefore, 
extraction itself is a problem. Producers of fossil fuels can hence become a possible solution 
to the climate problem by leaving fossil fuels in the ground. 
This view is often supported by what I would call the carbon budget argument. It states 
that if we are to limit the global temperature rise to 2ºC, then there is an upper limit, a budget, 
to how much emissions that we can allow. This is then viewed against the amount of fossil 
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fuel reserves that we know of, and the conclusion becomes clear: there are too much fossil 
fuels. 
The following chapter will present more of the contents of the main and additional 
materials, as well as an analysis of the ordering of power from shore. 
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5 Ordering power from shore 
The previous chapter outlined the contents of the reports, gave a brief synopsis of the 
Utsira process, and placed it in a broader climate-political context. In this chapter we turn to 
the materials in a slightly different, but more challenging and rewarding way. Rather than the 
contents itself, it is how the contents are ordering power from shore, that becomes the interest. 
Rather than asking what it says, we try to understand what it means. And following that line 
of thinking - what electrification becomes. 
The reports studied have all failed to predict the future in some way or the other 
(Martiniussen & Løvås, 2014). This is due to various assumptions about the future and 
choices made in the studies. Predicting the future is hard, and I would say that it is not that 
surprising that is not always successful. Looking back, it is easy to pass judgement. In this 
thesis however, this is not the reason why I study these reports. I am not seeking to 
understand why some assumption or choice has produced the “wrong” or “right” answer. The 
key question here is how these assumptions are ordering power from shore. 
Kristin Asdal has studied bureaucratic texts (2015) and asked: Who gets to play the 
main role, to be the main character? She argues that who gets to play this role, matters, and 
that it does something to the story. In the materials used in this study, there are two apparent 
main characters: CO2-emissions and abatement cost. This is evident in both the reports and 
the Utsira documents. This might not be surprising, given that I study what is said to be a 
climate mitigation strategy. However, it does reveal that the technological/material part of 
power from shore is less important. At the first point in time, the 1997 report, the feasibility 
and technical challenges are given some space. From 2002 and onwards, this is not always the 
case. The question is increasingly focused on how much is costs, not if it works. The 
technology and its feasibility are taken for granted. 
From the starting point, then, electrification is a question of emissions and cost. In the 
following sub-chapters, the three different ordering aspects described earlier will be analyzed. 
First, we will look at problem power from shore becomes a solution to. Second, we will look 
at the spatial ordering. Third, we will analyze the expertise and the knowledge that is used in 
the ordering of power from shore. Here, abatement cost becomes an important part. 
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5.1 Solving a problem 
This chapter presents an analysis of the orderings of power from shore as a solution to a 
problem. The materials have shown that there are two main problems that power from shore 
address; the climate problem narrowly defined as carbon emissions from fossil fuel 
consumption and a political problem posed by domestic emission targets. These two orderings 
will be explored in the following subchapters. 
5.1.1 The climate problem 
In the material, power from shore becomes a solution to the climate problem defined 
only as carbon emissions. This is opposed to also viewing the extraction itself as problematic. 
This is evident both in the reports, and the Utsira documents. The following quote from the 
2002 report shows this well: “increased extraction leads to increased emissions due to more 
power consumption” (p. 51). Here, the potentially increased emissions from the actual fossil 
fuels extracted are not the problem. The increased emissions are only from the energy 
consumption and emissions related to the extraction process. The increases in extracted fuels 
are not seen as problematic.  
In the Utsira process a picture is painted of the carbon emissions and how electrification 
can, or cannot, help bring down these emissions. This fits well with how the Kyoto systems 
accounting practices where CO2-emissions are the only accounted entity. “Electrification of 
the Utsira High [...] can stop an increase in emissions toward 2020 of approximately 800 000 
tons of CO2.” (Document 8:58 S (2013-2014)). Increased extraction due to lower operating 
expenses is discussed, but the possible additional climate burden from this increase is not 
evaluated. Even though there are discussions in the media about the climate effect, i.e. 
emission reduction, of power from shore to the Utsira High, it is not apparent in the political 
debate. Apart from a few statements from FrP members, there is not much questioning about 
the emission abatement potential of electrification. 
This one-sided focus on the emissions from the production facilities is clear within the 
documents. This ordering is well rooted in the Norwegian and international climate politics 
and power from shore fits neatly with it, its arguments and its accounting practices. The 
narrow focus on only the emissions from the production seems to be key to the Norwegian 
image of being a climate-nation, on top of being an oil-nation. Within this ordering, the oil 
from electrified fields becomes a solution, rather than a problem. 
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This is a quote from Tina Bru, a H representative, from the last meeting where power 
from shore was decided for Utsira. “When we now make sure that the emissions to air related 
to production at the Utsira High is eliminated due to power from shore, the oil and gas will 
be very climate-efficient” (Stortinget, 2015). What she says here is that by eliminating the 
emissions from the extraction, the oil becomes more climate friendly. The extent to which 
Norwegian oil and gas is “green” can be contested, and especially considering that the 
emissions from extraction is only a fraction of the emissions from using the same fossil fuels. 
This does however not shed the fact that an ordering of, and one-sided focus on the CO2-
emissions from the extraction process is necessary to make such a claim. 
There is no mention of the actual extraction being problematic. It is as though it is taken 
for granted. A simple and climate friendly solution would be to simply shut down or not start 
any more extraction. This, however, is not discussed. The exception is a minority suggestion 
from MDG in the final proposition from the SCEE to the Storting in the Utsira process. “The 
Committees member from MDG emphasize that electrification of the Utsira High is only the 
second best solution. [...] Given that Norway in practice has found more oil and gas than we 
can produce if we want to take into consideration our part of the global climate-responsibility 
and our reasonable share of total remaining global greenhouse gas emissions, the most 
responsible decision is to leave the resources at the Utsira High in the ground. To leave these 
resources in the ground means that we will refrain from supplying the atmosphere with 
emissions equivalent to 20 to 50 times more than what the emission abatement achieved by 
electrification.” (Innst. S 237 (2013-2014), p. 3). Other than this, the focus is strictly on 
emissions as the problem. Not even in a section in the second report on “Alternative measures 
for emission reduction” (NVE & NPD, 2002, p.68-69), is the possibility of leaving the fossil 
fuels in the ground considered. 
My informants do however show a nuanced view of this. Friends of the Earth Norway is 
in general skeptical to electrification, due to an increased pressure on building new hydro- or 
wind-power and transmission lines, i.e. damaging unspoiled nature. They are also against 
opening up new oil fields, both due to “traditional” environmental concerns and a concern for 
the climate. My informant Audun Johnson reflected on the issue of power from shore in 
relation to climate concerns. If one is against the project and extraction of the oil to begin 
with, but loses the battle, should one then jump to the secondary argumentation and work to 
get the field electrified? 
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My other informants seemed to agree on this subject. There is both a need to limit and 
slow down oil extraction, and secure that emissions from the extraction is as low as possible. 
This means that while the ordering of electrification is as a solution to limiting emissions, 
there is no perceived conflict with the ordering of the climate problem also as extraction. As 
Ola Elvestuen put it when I met him, “It is another discussion”. 
The informants nuanced view of the problem and the statement from MDG can also be 
seen as part of a trend towards seeing Norway as responsible also for the exported fuels. 
5.1.2 Solution to a political problem 
The analysis and close reading of the documents has revealed that power from shore 
also becomes a solution to a political problem, namely meeting political climate goals and 
commitments. “[T]here is still a gap in 8 million tons between the expected emissions in 2020 
and the Climate Compromise goals. If no new measures are put in place, both to limit new 
emissions and reduce existing emissions, the goal will not be met. Electrification of the Utsira 
High is one of the measures that can limit emission growth towards 2020” (Doc. 8:58 S 
(2013-2014), p.1). Electrification of the Utsira High now becomes a solution to meeting the 
agreed goal. It is more than cutting the emissions; it is also an answer to a political problem. 
As shown in a previous chapter, the election in 2013 effectively included all major parties to 
the Climate Compromise goals. The importance of political commitments and goals is also 
evident in the report series. Both the Kyoto-commitments and domestic goals are part of the 
ordering of power from shore. In the 2002 report, electrification becomes as a very costly 
contribution to the Kyoto commitment.  
As the political emission targets have increasingly become more focused on domestic 
measures, the possible solutions has been limited. The flexible mechanisms that are part of the 
Kyoto-protocol and the EU ETS cannot be used. While these mechanisms allow Norway to 
buy its way out of the problem, the Climate Compromise eliminates this as a possible 
solution. This strengthens power from shore as a mitigation strategy. In the Utsira process, 
there is a strong focus on the climate compromise. The presence of the domestic goals and the 
problems they raise becomes very important. “It will be very difficult to reach the emission 
goals if we do not have an area solution on the Utsira High” (Innst. S. nr. 237 (2013-2014), 
p.2). Power from shore becomes a solution to the political problem posed by the domestic 
reduction goals. 
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My informant Kaski from ZERO supports this view. She told me that she thinks the 
Climate Compromise was important for the Utsira High and that domestic goals have been a 
driving force. 
This confirms Tellmann’s (2000) statement that carbon emissions can be both a political 
problem and an environmental issue. What the environmental issue or political problem is, 
has been an empirical question and might be different for other abatement measures. 
5.2 Spatial orderings 
As a point of departure, the climate problem is definitely a global challenge. This is true 
whether the problem is defined as extraction, emissions, both or something else. Since power 
from shore is supposedly a solution to this challenge, one should anticipate that this is also 
how it is ordered; in a global ordering where “the planet’s best” is upheld.  
The analysis of the materials has identified that in addition to the global ordering; there 
are three spatial orderings, the local, domestic and international, that can be told apart. While 
they all rely on and are part of a global ordering, the rationales and their implications are quite 
different. This will be explored in the following subchapters. 
5.2.1 Local, domestic and international ordering 
The local ordering is where the continental shelf, a petroleum field, a platform or an 
area in the sea is the limitation. It creates a boundary where everything outside the local is 
erased from view. The following quotes are examples of this kind of ordering. In the second 
report from 2002, the authors discuss the potential for “Reduced emissions at sea” (NPD & 
NVE, 2002, p.14). Here, the continental shelf is isolated from everything else. The same 
ordering is also found in the first report. “If the continental shelf is evaluated in isolation, the 
reduction will be between 20 and 40 percent” (NPD & NVE, 1997, p.9).  
This ordering is used by the petroleum companies when calculating abatement cost. 
While the CO2-tax is a domestic tax, and the European emission quotas are international, at 
the project level they are evaluated within a local ordering. There is a fiscal boundary between 
the local and what is outside. Within this local ordering of power from shore, where the 
electrical energy comes from, and the potential emissions from its production, becomes 
irrelevant - as long as it is outside the local accounting system. It is the point source emissions 
that are the subject for calculation. If power from shore can eliminate emissions from a 
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platform, then that is the possible reduction. The possible emissions from the power source 
are not part of the view. The local ordering creates a clear boundary to what is outside. 
This is of course justifiable. Expecting that the oil companies have to assess the “whole 
picture” seems unreasonable. To make a decision about the mitigation project, the companies 
compare the local abatement cost to the cost of emissions (Statoil, 2014). If then the 
abatement cost is lower than the emissions cost, it will be profitable to invest in the mitigation 
project. The outside world is not important. 
This can be seen in the 2002 report that discusses reduced emissions at sea, where “all 
scenarios give the same emissions reduction” (NVE & NPD, 2002, p. 13). This is opposed to 
“net emissions reductions” (p. 62), where the origin of the electrical power leads to different 
results in different scenarios. The latter one is a global ordering, where there is no difference 
made as to where emissions occur. 
The second spatial ordering of power from shore that is evident in the material is the 
domestic. In the third report, “Electrification of the continental shelf is driven by a desire to 
reduce emissions in Norway” (p.53), and “the interface for the calculations is where the gas 
leaves the Norwegian pipelines” (p.46). These are but two examples. From the previous 
chapter, we also remember that power from shore became a solution to the domestic climate 
goals. These domestic goals are important for the ordering of power from shore as a domestic 
climate mitigation strategy, where action has to be done inside Norway. This can also be seen 
in this quote from Terje Aasland, energy-political spokesperson for AP. “I am happy that a 
unanimous committee is following up the Climate Compromise that the Storting has made 
about cutting emissions in Norway” (AP, 2014). 
The 2008 report includes a scenario with a dedicated gas power plant and the platforms. 
This scenario “makes it simple to estimate the [...] CO2-reductions within Norway’s border” 
(NPD et. al., 2008, p. ii), and also the total emission reduction, i.e. the global. There is a 
distinction made between “the continental shelf”, “within Norway’s boundaries” and 
“abroad”, when accounting the emissions (p. ii). These can be seen as different orderings, the 
local, the domestic and the global. 
My focus here on the word domestic is important, and it must not be confused with 
national. The national is not always strictly domestic. As shown in the previous chapter, the 
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Kyoto-protocol is based on national emission accounting systems, but as discussed, it allows 
for emissions in other countries to count towards a nations emission account, this is what I 
have identified as the international ordering. This is separate from the global in an important 
way. While in a global ordering of climate change the problem and its solutions are 
“planetary”, in the international it is international, i.e. among or between nations, and usually 
accompanied by a focus of cost-efficiency. 
In the 2002 report, “calculations indicate that the abatement cost will be high compared 
to today’s CO2-tax, anticipated international quota price and other measures in SFT’s 
abatement analyses” (NPD & NVE, 2002, p.7). The international quota price is part of the 
international ordering where power from shore to Norwegian oil field becomes a less 
desirable option for mitigating climate change. The national accounting systems and flexible 
mechanisms associated with the Kyoto regime puts power from shore in this international 
ordering.  
5.2.2 Spatial orderings at the four points in time 
There are multiple ordering logics at play at each of the four points in time. The close 
reading of the documents has however shown that one of the orderings is stronger than the 
other at each point. It is the ordering that is used when concluding the reports or the political 
process. 
In the 1997 report, it is the global ordering that is the most important. Yes, power from 
shore is seen as a measure to bring down domestic emissions, but the calculation premises are 
global. This is evident in the way the import-scenario is discussed, as emissions from 
imported electricity are accounted in the same way as the emissions on the continental shelf. 
No difference is made between the domestic and abroad. 
In 2002, this changes a bit. The Kyoto protocol seems to have made an impact, and an 
international ordering has become more prominent. “In a Kyoto and Gothenburg context 
Norway has committed to reducing national emissions, but our neighboring countries will be 
debited with emissions as a consequence of export to Norway if we import power to the 
continental shelf” (p. 13). Here, one can see how the (inter)national accounting systems and 
ordering has made its way into the sensemaking of power from shore and that the Kyoto 
protocol of 1997 put an increased focus on the national emissions accounts. This shows that 
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while the official accounting systems are based on national accounting, the ordering is 
international, where cost-efficiency between nations is the norm. 
In the third report from 2008 the domestic ordering is more prominent. This is 
especially related to what is known as scenario 3. As shown, this scenario reflects the effect of 
increased power production abroad in increased power price rather than through increased 
emissions. By using arguments related to the European cap and trade market, a domestic 
ordering is strengthened - the focus becomes what happens within Norwegian boundaries.  
The scenario based on power from the market and makes for “computationally simple 
assumptions and potentially low abatement costs” ( NPD et. al., 2008, p.39). The assumptions 
are simple because there is no need to understand where the power comes from, and hence 
include stipulated emissions from it. Every ton of CO2 removed on the continental shelf 
counts and the total becomes higher, and hence the abatement cost is lower. This shows that 
the local ordering can fit well with the domestic ordering. This scenario also strengthens the 
boundary between “within Norwegian boundaries” (p.ii) and “abroad” (p. ii).  
In the report, the global total emissions for this scenario is only determined by the 
Kyoto-commitments and the cap-and-trade EU ETS market. In the scenario, one includes 
“emissions commitments and trade” (p. 29). This means that whatever we do in Norway is 
seen not to affect the global. This ordering of power from shore places it outside a global 
ordering. The global emissions are seen as constant and power from shore is placed on the 
side of it. There is evidence of conflicting meanings concerning this scenario. “There are 
however a divide in perceptions about if the calculations of abatement cost in scenario 3 is as 
relevant as the calculations as scenario 1 and scenario 2.” (p. 54). Supposedly, this was 
argued by SFT (Martiniussen & Løvås, 2014). Ultimately, in the third report, there is a 
division between the domestic and the international orderings. 
After reading the chapter on problem orderings, it might not come as a surprise that it is 
a domestic ordering that is strongest in the Utsira High debate, because electrification of the 
Utsira High became a solution to the problem posed by domestic CO2 reduction targets. 
Through the Climate Compromise, the Norwegian climate politics are focused on domestic 
cuts and emission abatement measures. In general in Norway, there can be seen an increased 
skepticism to the international flexible mechanisms and the effect they have. There are at least 
raised critical questions and critiques about it (Martiniussen, 2013). 
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Oskar Grimstad from FrP made an interesting comment about the climate effect of 
electrifying Utsira where he uses the ordering international to challenge the domestic. This 
was during the final discussion in the Storting. “The climate effect, however, will be positive 
for Norway, but it must be allowed to question the cost-benefit and if this would have greater 
effect somewhere else, maybe in Europe, that would have reduced the global emissions” 
(Stortinget, 2015), he states. Grimstad draws on both the domestic (by claiming that it will be 
positive for Norway) and international (through international cost-efficiency) ordering, and 
links this to the global. His statement signals that it is the domestic ordering that has made 
him agree to the proposal, but at the same time challenges it by drawing on an international 
ordering. 
The local also becomes more important in the Utsira case. There is a focus on the sheer 
amount of point source emissions, and since Statoil and the business-economic calculations 
are part of it, the local ordering is strengthened. 
These findings connect well with the previous studies of Norwegian climate politics. 
Hovden and Lindseth (2004) showed how the international cost-efficiency ordering (what 
they call global thinking) became important in Norway through the 1990s, and Tellmann 
(2012) states that that around and after 2008, there was again a focus on the domestic 
emission targets. This is also what one sees in power from shore, but that the distinction 
national/global that Hovden and Lindseth use, is maybe not fine-grained enough for our 
inquiries about power from shore. 
5.3 An economic expert ordering 
The economic aspect stands out as one of the main parts of what power from shore 
becomes in Norwegian climate politics. Even though this is not surprising, it is very evident. 
From the first report, cost is seen as very important. When commissioning the first 
report, the government (on behalf of the Storting) commissioned an “overview of the energy 
amount and cost of using power from shore to supply the oil-facilities in the sea” (NPD & 
NVE, 1997). The technical aspects included in the reports seems mostly to be the basis for 
later economic calculations, but also, admittedly, a study of the feasibility to understand what 
parts of the continental shelf are possible to electrify “practically and technically” (p. 3). 
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This means that the most desired or important expertise is that of those that can 
calculate the cost of power from shore. The cost calculations that are done are called 
abatement cost calculations, and the results derived from the assessment are commonly 
referred to as the abatement cost22. The abatement cost is usually presented as unit cost of 
NOK per ton CO2 emission, by dividing the calculated net cost on the possible emission 
reductions23. 
The overall impression from the reports is that the abatement cost is the most important 
part of power from shore. Most of the content leads up to the calculations, and the reports are 
concluded with remarks about the abatement cost. Besides the commissioning of cost 
overview in 1997, the authors of the 2002 report clearly state that “[t]he main goal for this 
study is to derive the abatement cost of CO2 and NOx” (NPD & NVE, 2002, p. 58). In the 
third report, the opening sentence in the summary is “New calculations show that the 
abatement cost of electrification of existing installations on the continental shelf is from 1600 
NOK per ton and up” (NPD et. al., 2008, p. i), effectively setting the agenda for the report. 
In the following two chapters we will investigate how this focus on abatement cost is 
ordering power from shore and how this ordering is facing challenges. Then, we will turn to 
the expertise that takes part in this ordering and the mandated power that they have. In the last 
subchapter, the limits of expert orderings are discussed. 
5.3.1 Abatement cost as a tool for comparison 
Through the calculation of abatement cost, the CO2 emissions from installations are 
made comparable to other abatement measures. Donald MacKenzie (2009) has studied the 
emergence of carbon markets and how emissions are made the same in such markets. 
Through the calculation of abatement cost, electrification is made the same as any other 
measure, in the name of cost-efficiency. The 1997 reports state that the calculation of 
abatement cost allows for comparison between both scenarios and to other abatement 
measures within the oil sector and in other sectors. It is “to give a better indication of the 
cost-efficiency” (NPD & NVE, 1997, p. 3). The report was released in the same year as, but 
prior to the Kyoto-agreement and protocol. In the second report, electrification is compared to 
the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto system, and the conclusion is clear: it is a “very costly 
                                                 
22 The Norwegian word is tiltakskostnad or tiltakskost 
23 This is a simple presentation of the abatement cost. The actual calculation is admittedly a bit more 
complicated. 
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measure” (NPD & NVE, 2002, p.9) to reach Norway's Kyoto commitments, especially when 
considering the possibilities for using the Kyoto-mechanisms. The third report further state 
this: “Calculation of abatement cost is a useful tool for evaluating how national emission 
obligations can be met” (NPD et. al., p.38, 2008). In the Utsira process, Statoil compares their 
calculated abatement cost to the cost of emissions to decide on the investment.  
The materials show how abatement cost becomes a tool for comparison where the end 
goal is cost efficiency. The notion of tool is here is not an unfamiliar notion within the field of 
STS. The term has been used to describe carbon markets as tools of abatement (MacKenzie, 
2009) and for tools of knowledge (Becker & Clark, 2001) within bureaucracy such as reports, 
protocols and questionnaires, among others. Kristin Asdal uses the term tools of democracy, 
for technologies of politics for public participation - technical and material arrangements that 
enable and shape politics (Asdal, 2008). I’ve used this notion to point to the varied 
assemblage of practices that is used to govern, and how abatement cost is such an assemblage. 
The notion is related to the art, tactics and techniques of government, from Michel Foucault 
(2007) famous lecture on governmentalité. For power from shore, the use of abatement cost as 
a tool for comparison usually results in it being cost inefficient and thus not a preferable 
option to mitigate emissions. For the politicians, it becomes a tool for comparison that lets 
them evaluate the measure up against other measures. 
This is not a sole example in Norwegian climate politics. The abatement cost and cost-
efficiency ordering was e.g. also a very important part of ClimateCure2020, a Norwegian 
governmental white paper (Klimakur, 2010). The report lists a huge amount of possible 
abatement measures, according to their abatement cost - lowest to highest. 
This ordering of power from shore, by making it the same as any other abatement 
measure, hides all the peculiarities that are part of it. Power from shore is put side-by-side 
with energy savings in buildings, public transport initiatives and taking the bike to work. But 
the evaluation criteria become strictly economic, quantitative. The qualitative differences are 
hidden from view. I would argue that such differences can be important. Power from shore is 
different than other measures. An example is that it is a measure aimed at the petroleum 
sector, which is the biggest (and growing) emission sector in Norway and very profitable for 
both companies and the state. Another example is in the paradox of using “clean” energy to 
pump up oil. A calculation of and focus abatement cost to some extent seems to hide ethical 
qualms. 
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5.3.2 Abatement cost under attack 
“It is often claimed that when estimating the abatement cost, the benefit side is harder 
to quantify than the cost side. [...] It is a fact that not all benefits can be quantified, and this is 
also the case here” (NVE et. al., 2008, p. 46). This quote is from the 2008 report, and to 
handle these limitations, the authors has included a table where “un-priced” (p.46) effects are 
presented. There is an indication as to whether these effects would pull the abatement cost 
either up or down. “Compared to the report from NVE/NPD in 2002, the calculations in this 
report includes more cost and benefit elements.” (p. v), it is stated. 
I read this as a defense of the abatement cost calculations. It is obvious that the 
calculations has been doubted as a good tool for making a decision about power from shore, 
and that the authors try to increase its credibility by including more of these so-called cost and 
benefit elements. This points in a direction of cost-benefit-analysis and it suggest that much, if 
not everything, can be reflected onto the abatement cost. The authors state that it is hard to 
quantify (i.e. put a price on), but have no problems with relating the consequences to the 
abatement cost. These consequences include factors such as the alternative value of the 
project capacities (profitable project might be put on ice), effects on Health, Safety and 
Environment (HSE), extended production due to lower operating expenses and other 
environmental effects on flora and fauna. This displays the limitations of the abatement cost 
calculations, but at the same time try to legitimize them through the reference to how the 
consequences affect the cost. It suggests that what we should relate to is the economic value 
of HSE and the flora and fauna. 
The difference might seem small, but there is a distinct difference here. In an ordering 
of power from shore in a cost-effectiveness, or cost-effect24, ordering, the qualitative is left 
outside, and can be dealt with outside the economic valuation. With cost-benefit ordering, 
where “everything” can be translated from economic externalities to economic realities, this is 
not the case. 
In the official guide from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) on socio-economic analysis 
(2005) this distinction is presented. Cost-benefit analysis is “A systematic mapping of the 
advantages and disadvantages of a given measure. Benefits and costs are evaluated in 
                                                 
24 Cost-effect is understood as a link between cost, and what comes out. Here, it is understood as the relation 
between how much you have to pay and the outcome (amounts of abated CO2 emissions), without taking 
“everything” into account. 
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kroners as far as professionally justifiable” (MoF, 2005, p. 10). Cost-effectiveness analysis is 
“A systematic valuation of the costs related to different measures that could reach the same 
goal. The costs are valuated in kroners, and one seeks to find the cheapest way to reach a 
given goal” (p.10). 
It is not given that it can be done, or that it is desirable, to evaluate everything related to 
power from shore in terms of a monetary cost. Money and economics have become very 
important in today's society, and it is understandable that we want to get the most out of our 
shared money, but sometimes other values, that are indeed hard to “price”, should maybe be 
left out. 
Heikki Holmås has told me that one of the strategies he used in the Utsira High process 
was to attack the abatement numbers that Statoil presented. Expertise from ABB, a supplier of 
cables and equipment for electrification, was part of this. The internal interest rate, or the 
discount-rate, was one of the parts that Holmås was skeptical about, because from a societal 
perspective, the rate that Statoil use in their business calculations might not be valid. He told 
me that he is concerned with the cost, and that it is right to discuss it, but he sees them as a bit 
short-sighted. For him personally, there are other concerns that are more important. These are 
concerns about such things as lock-in of high emission sources, rigging the end user for the 
renewable society and that for the European and international cap-and-trade regime we need 
to cut so that the cap can be set even tighter. 
This tells me that while the experts and their (economic) orderings are important, other 
orderings and values are maybe just as important. 
5.3.3 The experts 
I have argued that abatement cost is one of the main characters in the materials and that 
expertise is a big part in this ordering. Here, I define expertise as the ones that are considered 
to have the “right” knowledge, who produce this knowledge and are hence given the authority 
or mandate for ordering power from shore. The experts are the people or organizations that 
take part in this ordering. By investigating who the experts are, the ambition is to also 
investigate how these experts are ordering. 
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In the report series, the relevant expertise is easy to identify. As noted, the strategy has 
been both to look at and through the reports. If we take this quite literally, and basically try to 
“judge the book by its cover”, we see who the authors are, the trusted expertise. 
The logos on the cover of the reports are representing the authors. In the two first 
reports, NPD and NVE are the (only) authors. This leaves us to think that the relevant 
expertise within public administration on power from shore is found in these departments. In 
the 2008 report, two more logos find their ways to the front page. One is from the Petroleum 
Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) that until 2004 was part of the NPD, and hence was also 
present in the two prior reports. The fourth logo and author, is new. It is the SFT25. This third 
report, then, adds pollution expertise to the author-list. This leaves the impression that the 
topic has moved towards that area of expertise. Also, it indicates that the knowledge within 
might be more “solid” than the two other reports, by including more expertise. On the third 
time of updating the reports, the ambition might be to produce knowledge that does not need a 
new update for a few years. Another aspect that points in this direction is the thickness of the 
reports. The first one totals at 63 pages, the next one at 76 and the last one at 99. 
In the Utsira process, the expertise is more diversified. To begin with, the most relevant 
expertise is the oil companies themselves. In an oil field development, it is the companies that 
are in charge of evaluating, calculating and provide the needed documentation and plans. This 
also goes for power from shore. Statoil, as the project leader and operator of Johan Sverdrup, 
thus are the experts from the start, and power from shore becomes a business decision. For 
Statoil’s experts it would be naturally to order power from shore as a local abatement measure 
that has a strict focus on the climate problem as emissions from the extraction, not the 
extracted fuels themselves. 
In early December, KrF representative Kjell Ingolf Ropstad, posed a written question to 
The Minister of Oil and Energy Tord Lien, asking what he did to “... signal political 
impatience [...] include the Storting [...] and [secure] that an overall socio economic 
assessment was to be done?” (Document 15 S. 160 (2013-2014)) This signals both the 
impatience from the Storting towards the Government and the importance of economic 
calculation, and the trust that is put in those numbers. 
                                                 
25 SFT is now known as the Norwegian Environment Agency (MD) 
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This also suggests that there is unrest with Statoil as a knowledge producer and their 
ordering of power from shore. The use of the word socioeconomic suggests that the 
anticipated business-economic calculations from Statoil are not enough for the Storting, or at 
least Ropstad. In a mid-January press release the OED stated that the expected cost of the 
UHPH was now “many billion” (OED, 2014) more than previously estimated. In the wake of 
the OED press release and the speculations on the UHPH costs and solution, the opposition 
was starting to talk about external and independent assessments of the estimated costs. The 
estimates were doubted. “Tord Lien must immediately give access to the basis for the decision 
making” (Rønning, 2014), said Fredric Hauge leader of ENGO Bellona. 
In the end, Statoil released a cost calculation report, but much of the report had been 
censored (Statoil, 2014). Statoil’s reasons for keeping numbers private are said to be 
commercial, but in the media, this secrecy is also seen as an indication for that the oil 
companies and NPD were keeping information from the Storting (Haugstad, 2014). 
In April, Add Energy released a study commissioned by Energi Norge, stating that the 
abatement cost could be as low as 40 NOK per ton (Add Energy, 2014). Statoil commented 
on the new numbers, claiming that they are old and that they have no reason to doubt their 
own numbers. Add Energy represents a group of experts that take part in ordering power from 
shore - the “independent” researchers. These are consultancies and research centers, and are 
ordering power from shore in the same way as Statoil. Also, public administration and its 
expertise in the Utsira process, especially through old reports on electrification. 
Suppliers of electrification equipment are also experts in the Utsira case, and have 
amongst other things been invited to the Storting to participate in hearings. The material 
suggests that, together with the independent researchers, they have been important as a 
counterweight to the knowledge produced by Statoil. ABB, a company that amongst other 
things deliver cables and equipment that can be used for power from shore, has been 
prominent. My informants Holmås and Kaski tells me that ABB has strategically been used as 
a knowledge resource and expertise to be a corrective or counterforce to Statoil. Kaski from 
ZERO tells me that it was problematic for ZERO to discuss abatement cost because “we have 
no way to verify the numbers that Statoil presents [...] and we don’t have much credibility”. 
ABB on the other hand, has this credibility. ABB is a supplier of equipment to the Johan 
Sverdrup project, and has therefore mostly discussed on cost and other aspects in general 
terms. 
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5.3.4 Expert power 
The quote from Kaski above points us in a direction of the power relation between the 
oil companies and the Storting. The Storting makes their decision about a petroleum field 
based on knowledge produced by the oil companies. This gives the companies the power to 
define the issue at hand. This expert power relation was part of the Utsira debate. 
Because the three smaller fields on the Utsira High had to prepare for electrification and 
the politicians had stated a goal about it in the climate compromise it seemed like the desire 
for electrification was strong. But was this a demand? At question time in the Storting 5th of 
February 2014, this question is addressed. “Does the Minister [Tord Lien] see that it will look 
like oil companies can pressure the state into dropping environmental demands if the demand 
for full electrification is waived?”, Heikki Holmås (2014) from SV, asked. Among other 
things Lien responded that “The Storting has not decided, as it is claimed here, that the 
Utsira High shall have power from shore“ (2014). The question from Holmås is interesting 
because it shows unease with the power relation between the Storting and the licenses. 
“Now we will see if it is the state or Statoil that controls Norwegian environmental 
politics” (Revheim, 2014). This is a statement from ENGO Young Friends of the Earth 
Norway after the concept choice was presented by Statoil in mid-February. It is an obvious 
rhetorical move, but yet interesting. Fredric Hauge from ENGO Bellona asks the Storting to 
show Statoil “who is in charge” (Estep, 2015). Of course it is the Storting that has the 
institutionalized political power, but is it necessarily so that they are the most powerful. The 
paragraphs above suggest that the oil companies have some power over the Storting. At lease, 
they have the power of setting the ordering of the abatement measure. 
Another power-related aspect in the debate on power from shore to Utsira was when the 
Storting could (or should) exercise their power. The normal point of intervention for the 
Storting is the PDO. In a seminar held by the Standing Committee on Energy and 
Environment, on the 10th of March, Statoil said that they should have gotten notice from the 
OED “a month ago” (Quale, 2014) if they were to realize full electrification of the Utsira 
High. The question of whether or not the intervention with the private proposal was timely or 
indeed necessary was discussed both before and after the decision to demand power from 
shore was made. 
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5.3.5 Limits to ordering 
Compared to power from shore as presented in the report series, electrification is not as 
neat in the Utsira High process. Where the reports present feasible technical solutions, 
scenario-based cost calculations and clear conclusions, the Utsira High process is much more 
complex. This is important to notice. As has been shown, the political situation, cost 
calculations and power relationships are complex parts of what electrification becomes. Also 
other concerns, such as employment in the oil sector (which at the time was facing major cuts 
due to low oil prices) and HSE has been part of the complex picture.  
Electrification seems a lot simpler - not to say neat - in the reports. The complexities are 
hidden behind assumptions and calculations. Brian Wynne has studied the natural scientific 
framing of the climate problem - making the climate safe and manageable - and how this puts 
the outside world in brackets (Wynne, 2010). Wynne is concerned about how the framing 
shapes the public meaning of the climate problem, but is also an interesting study of what is 
left out - what is “erased from view” ( Wynne, 2010, p. 289). 
According to John Law (1994), different ways of ordering might create apparent pools 
of order, which are the product, outcome or effect of a lot of work. I would argue that to some 
extent, the reports are creating such a pool, by erasing other orderings from view. One must 
go outside the reports to find orderings that might dissolve them. Following this line of 
thinking I would argue that there is more ordering, but less order, in the Utsira documents.  
“Many of us have learned to want to cleave to an order. This is a modernist dream. In 
one way or another, we are attached to the idea that if our lives, our organizations, our social 
theories or our societies were ‘properly ordered’ then all would be well. And we take it that 
such ordering is possible, at least some of the time. So when we encounter complexity we tend 
to treat it as distraction. We treat is as a sign of the limits to order. Or we think of it as 
evidence of failure [...] The social world is complex and messy [...] this book is about 
ordering rather than order. And it is about heterogeneity rather than purity” (Law, 1994, p.4-
5). Leaning on this quote, I would argue that the heterogeneity shown in the Utsira process is 
not problematic, but rather that it is expected and that it is the purity of the reports is the 
“abnormal”. 
STS scholars has stated that the separation and distinctions between the natural and the 
social (Callon, 1986), human and non-human (Latour, 1993), science and technology (Asdal 
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et al., 2007), and science and politics (Jasanoff, 1990) are false. Yet, experts are often called 
upon to help political decisions - to find the “right” or “independent” answer. My research 
and inquiries into power from shore has shown how there are limits to the ordering that these 
expert reports bring, and that there are multiple answers, that all can be “right”. I believe that 
there is indeed room for the experts and the knowledge they produce, but there must also be 
an awareness of what they, and the work they do, erase from view. 
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6 Reflections on materials and 
methods 
The choice of the main analytical concept in this study, ordering, has been an iterative 
(and somewhat cyclical) process between the materials and the STS literature. In terms of 
research methods, the analytical method has been part inductive and part deductive. The end 
choice of ordering as a governing idea for the thesis was then made in connection to both the 
STS literature, the reviewed literature on Norwegian climate politics, the materials and the 
sites. The main research question is an open question, and hence deserves an open concept. I 
believe that ordering has proven its usefulness in this study. It has worked well as both a 
thinking tool in the study and as a structuring device for this thesis. 
In the previous chapter, one of the findings is that there are limits to the ordering of 
power from shore that the expert reports do. How is this thesis different then? Have I not tried 
to impute patterns and orderings - tried to make the world simpler? At first glance, this might 
seem problematic, and make it challenging for me to state that the results and findings that I 
have presented here are real, or trustworthy.  
I will argue that the results presented in this report are solid, but they are indeed the 
result of a lot of work. As part of this work I have made choices, and the story I have told is 
but one of many stories that can be told about power from shore. This is in part also one of the 
main parts of this thesis work. Electrification can be ordered in many different ways, and the 
main research question has answers, not an answer. 
To meet the challenge, I have been inspired by the strong programme (Bloor, 1973), 
within Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge (SSK) and its principle of reflexivity - that the 
study of knowledge also must be applicable to those who study knowledge. STS researchers 
has shown how the person that does scientific work is not a modest witness (Haraway, 1997; 
Shapin & Schaffer, 1985), but all witnesses are human and fallible (Berg, 1998). I am not a 
modest witness - I am interested and engaged. But I have made an effort to be symmetric, 
reflexive, open and unbiased in my studies and my accounts of power from shore. But then 
again, it would be dishonest of me to state that nothing is erased from view. 
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7 Summary and further research 
This thesis set out to understand what power from shore is by pulling on resources from 
the STS field and from STS scholars. In particular, it has been inspired by John Law (1994) 
by using the term ordering. Ordering has been a main concept and a way to impute patterns of 
sensemaking on the empirical material studied. 
 The main material used in this thesis has been bureaucratic documents related to power 
from shore at four points in time. These points are the release of a series of reports from the 
NPD and NVE, dated in 1997, 2002 and 2008. A political process on electrification of the 
Utsira High in 2014 is the fourth point. In addition, media sources and supplementary 
interviews have been used. 
The main question of the thesis has been: What is power from shore? This has been 
answered by studying what it is made to be - the ordering of it. The empirical material and 
previous studies of Norwegian climate politics has turned the attention to three specific 
aspects. These are the problem that electrification becomes a solution to, the spatial ordering 
and the expertise that is involved in the ordering. 
Power from shore is found to be a solution to the climate problem, and this problem is 
defined strictly as the carbon emissions from the extraction facilities. A different view would 
be to say that the problem is also that there is too much extraction, and that emission from the 
extracted and exported fuels is a problem. The paradox of cutting emissions from extraction 
of fuels, while one knows that the emission from use of the extracted and exported fuels are 
tens of times higher, is avoided by strictly focusing on the emissions. While power from shore 
is in an ordering with strict focus on the emissions from the extraction, my informants from 
the Utsira process have shown that they identify the problem also as the extracted fuels, but 
that the rate of extraction is considered to be a separate discussion. A second problem that 
power from shore becomes a solution to is a political problem, namely reaching the political 
goals set for domestic emission cuts.  
There no is doubt that the climate problem is global, or “planetary”. This study has 
identified three additional spatial orderings of power from shore as a climate mitigation 
strategy. These are termed local, domestic and international.  
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The CO2 tax on the continental shelf is important in the local ordering, where the 
electrification projects are seen in isolation from the world. It is the point-source emissions 
that become important. Emissions from the potential power source are not part of the account. 
Because the companies are taxed according to their local emissions, there is a clear boundary 
set between the platforms and the outside world. 
The domestic ordering of electrification as an emission abatement measure orders 
power from shore especially in accordance to domestic CO2 emission goals. The reduction 
goals in the political Climate Compromise of 2008 and 2012 are important in this ordering. 
The international ordering is related to the accounting scheme of e.g. the Kyoto-
protocol that allows for paying for emission cuts abroad to be counted towards national 
accounts. The national is not necessarily domestic, because the focus is on international cost-
efficiency. Cuts should be done where it is cheapest among or between nations. 
Alongside emissions, abatement cost is one of the main characters in the material. The 
abatement cost is calculated in NOK per ton CO2, and becomes a tool for comparing different 
abatement measures to each other. The goal is cost-efficiency. This ordering of power from 
shore effectively hides the peculiarity that is part of it. “Cost-efficiency became, so to say, the 
gold standard whereby measures were evaluated”, Tellman (2012) states about 
environmental policy in Norway. Making power from shore the same as any other measures 
can be problematic, as it disqualifies the quantitative differences and to some extent also its 
ethical qualms. 
There are many experts that take part in ordering power from shore. Public 
administration, oil companies, independent researchers and equipment suppliers have been 
identified in this story. The power relation between these is part of what power from shore 
becomes. 
The study has also shown that power from shore is complex and messy, and that the 
ordering as done in expert reports and, indeed, in this thesis, cannot keep everything within 
view - it is simplifications. There are limits to ordering. This is not to say that the studies like 
this one and the reports are useless. They provide valuable insights, but we must be aware of 
their ordering of the world, and what they “erase from view” (Wynne, 2010, p.289). There is 
not one right answer, but multiple answers to the research question. 
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So, what is power from shore? My study has shown that at all four points in time it is a 
measure to solve the problem of excessive emissions of CO2. It is also different at all four 
points. In 1997, it becomes a cost-inefficient abatement measure to mitigate global emissions. 
In 2002 it becomes a cost-inefficient measure to meet the national commitments in the 
international Kyoto-regime, especially compared to the flexible mechanisms. In 2008 it 
becomes a cost-inefficient measure to bring down domestic emissions, but within a European 
electricity and emission quota market. Finally, in 2014, power from shore becomes a 
necessary measure to solve the problem posed by domestic emission reduction targets. The 
Storting ended up ordering the companies to electrify.  
In the end, this study of a single abatement measure tells a bigger story about 
Norwegian climate politics. And what has become evident in this story, is that the underlying 
premise is continued extraction of fossil fuels from the continental shelf. I have shown how 
the possibility of stopping or not starting production is not part of the orderings, even though 
it is a rather simple solution. There are however trends that point to a shift of focus towards 
also seeing the extraction of fossil fuels itself as problematic.  
Further research is needed to fully understand power from shore, and maybe to try and 
understand what it might become in the future. I suggest that studying the practices of 
abatement cost calculations can be an interesting entrance into the inner workings of climate 
politics and power from shore decision making. If drawing on resources from the emerging 
field of valuation studies (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013), I believe that this can provide 
important insights. 
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